In Re RZ3262019 Limited [2026] HKCFI 6356 (HCCW 244/2023)[1], Harris J examined how the Companies Court resolves contested replacement-liquidator applications where rival creditors are divided by ongoing recovery litigation. Declining to appoint an applicant creditor’s preferred nominees who were already acting as receivers over shares in the company’s subsidiaries, the Court underscored the statutory bar in section 262B(3)(f) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32) (“CWUMPO”) and ordered adverse costs even though the parties ultimately reached agreement on the identities of the replacement liquidators.
Background
RZ3262019 Limited (“Company”) was in compulsory liquidation, with its debt held principally by Happy Lion Ventures Limited (“Happy Lion”) (approximately 38%), Zhou Ying Investments Group Limited (“Zhou Ying”) (approximately 58%), and Yuzhou Group Holdings Company Limited (“Yuzhou”) (approximately 4%).
The incumbent joint and several liquidators of the Company (“Incumbent Liquidators”) had commenced unfair preference proceedings in HCMP 1589/2024 (“UP Proceedings”) against Zhou Ying, Yuzhou and others, which survived strike-out in September 2025 after the Incumbent Liquidators narrowed parts of their claims.
On 20 January 2025, Zhou Ying issued a summons seeking the removal of the Incumbent Liquidators on the basis of misconduct arising from certain applications they made to the Court for Norwich Pharmacal disclosure. Subsequently, the Incumbent Liquidators called for meetings of creditors and contributories of the Company to be held on 23 January 2026 to consider resolutions for their resignation and replacement (“Resolutions”). Zhou Ying (being the sole shareholder of the Company) and Yuzhou (which together with Zhou Ying held the majority of the Company’s debt) voted in favour of the Resolutions while Happy Lion voted against, as a result of which the Resolutions were passed.
On 27 January 2026, Happy Lion issued a summons seeking to inter alia appoint Mr Glen Ho and Ms Cato Hau of Deloitte (collectively, the “Deloitte Nominees”), who were already acting, on the appointment of Happy Lion, as receivers over the Company’s shares in two BVI subsidiaries, as the replacement liquidators. Subsequently, Happy Lion nominated Mr Chan Leung Lee and Mr Wilfred Wu of RSM HK Business Advisory Limited (collectively, the “RSM Nominees”) in the alternative. Happy Lion relied on its nominees’ familiarity with the Company’s affairs and offered to fund the UP Proceedings if they were appointed.
On the other hand, Zhou Ying and Yuzhou’s position was that independent liquidators from Panel A should be appointed instead. Neither camp sought to keep the Incumbent Liquidators in office.
Independence and Section 262B(3)(f) Disqualification
Harris J reaffirmed the principles restated by the Court of Appeal in Re BGA Holdings Limited (No 2) [2026] 1 HKLRD 54 at [52]–[53]. Guided by the best interests of all interested in the winding up, the Court gives due weight to creditor views without being bound by them. As an officer of the court, a liquidator must be independent and seen to be independent, and should not be appointed where there is any real — even if small — prospect of conflict between interest and duty.
Harris J highlighted section 262B(3)(f) of the Companies (Winding Up and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap. 32), enacted in 2017, which disqualifies a receiver or manager of the company’s property from acting as liquidator without leave of the Court. This was because liquidation is a class action designed to protect the interests of unsecured creditors, whereas generally receivership is designed to protect the interests of security holders who appointed the receiver.
Following the enactment of section 262B(3)(f), pre-2017 authorities provide diminished guidance value as to the circumstances in which a receiver of company assets should be appointed as its liquidator.
Harris J opined that one such situation in which the Court may grant leave under section 262B(3)(f) is where no creditor objects to the appointment and sensible reasons are advanced for the choice. This may arise where the receiver is only appointed over a single property which is to be sold.
On the other hand, the fact that insolvency practitioners had acted as receivers of major assets of a company giving them familiarity with a company’s affairs is a factor that leans against appointing them as liquidators. This had been recognised even in the pre-2017 case of Re The Sun’s Group Limited (unrep., HCCW 425/2003, 17 June 2004) per Kwan J (as she then was).
Applying the principles above, Harris J held that as the Deloitte Nominees were receivers of Company property appointed at the volition of Happy Lion, it invited the submission that they lacked sufficient independence. On the other hand, Zhou Ying and Yuzhou sought the appointment of replacement liquidators who were wholly independent. In the circumstances, the appointment of the Deloitte Nominees would be inappropriate.
Breaking Creditor Deadlock and Costs
While there were further arguments over the suitability of the RSM Nominees, Harris J did not regard them as particularly germane to the issue to be decided: giving due weight to the matters which Happy Lion pointed to and the fact that Zhou Ying and Yuzhou appeared to have at least a sufficiently strong case for being treated as unsecured creditors of the Company so that they held sway at any meeting of creditors, what is the appropriate course for the court to take in resolving the dispute over who should be the new liquidators?
In light of Harris J’s indications, the matter was stood down and the parties eventually agreed that Mr Derek Lai and Mr Adrian Chan of Ernst & Young be appointed as the replacement liquidators. As Happy Lion had sought to appoint its own nominees but failed, it was ordered to pay Zhou Ying’s and Yuzhou’s costs.
Key Takeaways
- Independence takes priority over familiarity. Section 262B(3)(f) of the CWUMPO disqualifies a receiver or manager of the company’s property from acting as liquidator without leave of the Court. Familiarity gained through a receivership over major company assets leans against appointment.
- Funding offers do not confer nominee control. Willingness to fund recovery claims does not entitle a creditor to install its own nominated liquidators in the face of legitimate concerns as to their independence.
- An agreed appointment does not eliminate adverse costs risk. The Court looks to the substance of the outcome. Happy Lion was ordered to pay Zhou Ying’s and Yuzhou’s costs because its bid to appoint its preferred nominees failed, while the neutral appointment they advocated was achieved.
Read the judgment here: https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/word/vetted/other/en/2023/HCCW000244A_2023.docx
Mr Anson Wong SC, Mr Lai Chun Ho and Mr Han Sheng Lim, instructed by Jingtian & Gongcheng LLP, acted for the Opposing Creditor (Zhou Ying Investments Group Limited).
Mr William Wong SC and Mr Martin Kok, instructed by Squire Patton Boggs, acted for the Opposing Creditor (Yuzhou Group Holdings Company Limited).
Ms Jasmine Cheung, instructed by DLA Piper Hong Kong, acted for the Incumbent Joint and Several Liquidators of the Company.
[1] Re RZ3262019 Limited [2026] HKCFI 6356 (HCCW 244/2023, 19 November 2026, Harris J), available at https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/word/vetted/other/en/2023/HCCW000244A_2023.docx.






